Objectives: The religious landscape of older adults around the world is changing profoundly. Yet until now, no study has chronicled these changes or compared expected aging patterns of religious groups. Differential aging among religious groups can have important economic and social consequences. This study estimates and projects the future religious composition by age at the global and regional levels. Method: This study presents estimates of age structures by religion for 2010 and projections until 2050. It is based on analyses of more than 2,500 censuses, registers, and surveys from 198 countries. Regional and global results are the aggregate of demographic projections carried out at the country level. Results: In 2010, Muslims were least likely to be aged 60 or older (7% of all Muslims), and Jews were most likely to be in this age group (20% of all Jews). By 2050, we project that Buddhists and the religiously unaffiliated will have the oldest populations (both will have 32% above the age of 60), whereas Muslims will remain the youngest religious group (with only 16% above the age of 60). Christians will, globally, age relatively slowly, from 14% to 21% above the age of 60 from 2010 to 2050. Discussion: The religious landscape among the world's seniors will change fundamentally in the coming years, due to the combination of rapid aging among the religiously unaffiliated and Buddhist populations and the persistence of relatively young age structures among Muslims and Christians, which are the dominant religions in Africa.
Religion is important for several dimensions of older individuals' lives-yet, there has been a lack of data documenting religious affiliation by age around the world. Older age segments are increasingly important in determining overall religious composition; improvements in survival and aging of large cohorts imply that globally, the population share aged 60 or more is projected to increase from 11% in 2010 to 22% by 2050 (UNPD, 2015) . Earlier worldwide estimates and projections of religious distributions have not focused on age variation or changes within older age groups over time (Johnson & Grim, 2010; Stonawski, Skirbekk, Hackett, et al., 2015) . The current study is the first that estimates and projects age-specific distribution of religious affiliation worldwide.
Changes in religious groups' age distributions could potentially have wide-ranging societal implications. Age variation in religious distributions can affect the risk of conflict and the degree of cooperation: The incidence of war is more common between religious groups with a younger age composition and less frequent among communities with older age structures (Nordås & Davenport, 2013; Urdal, 2006) . The willingness to pay for public social welfare programs can decrease when those who contribute differ from those who are beneficiaries in terms of their ethnocultural characteristics (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Uslaner, 2014) . In effect, when religious groups show contrasting age patterns, this could potentially affect the level of support for and the sustainability of social welfare programs. Differences in the pace of aging across religious and nonreligious groups may also affect the relative economic and social influences of different religious groups, as income and political power tend to reach their peak in late adulthood (OECD, 2008; Vanhuysse, 2014) .
Aging of religious communities can affect how religious faith is expressed and which dimensions of religiosity that are emphasized. The role of religion can change over the life course in the context of fewer remaining years of life and increasing prevalence of disease (Idler, 2006; Vaupel, 2010) . For instance, religious texts and rituals may become more important for older adults, particularly if they derive a sense of meaning in life from religion (Krause, 2003) . Religious faith at older ages can also affect risk factors (including diet and alcohol consumption), which in turn could affect important for health outcomes at older ages (Koenig, King, & Carson, 2012) .
Religion can be a central source of social support (Idler, 2006) and social integration (Rote, Hill, & Ellison, 2013) , which may be particularly important after retirement (Damman, Henkens, & Kalmijn, 2015) . A French study of Christians aged 65 years and older found that religious experiences positively predicted self-rated health and life satisfaction (Bailly & Roussiau, 2010) . Studies of Hindus in India find that many seek religious answers when trying to cope with illness at later stages of life (Pandya, 2016; Raveesh, 2014) .
Changes in the religious distribution of older age groups can also influence the degree of religious socialization of their grandchildren (Voas & Storm, 2012) . A U.S. longitudinal survey found that grandparents influenced grandchildren's religious service attendance and religious belief, independent of the influence of the grandchildren's parents (Bengtson, Copen, Putney, & Silverstein, 2009) . Grandparents influence how their grandchildren are socialized and to what extent religious beliefs (or nonbeliefs) are passed on-particularly if older individuals live longer and experience more years of coexistence with these children (Putney et al., 2013) .
Trends in the Relationship Between Religion and Age
Studies from several Western nations have found that older individuals tend to be more likely to have a religious affiliation than younger individuals (Crockett & Voas, 2006; Twenge et al., 2016) . Also, a global study based on the World Values Survey found that older age relates to an increased likelihood of organizational religious involvement in a majority of the countries surveyed (Hayward & Krause, 2015) . This is likely to follow from either religious change over the life cycle (where older individuals become more religious with age) or from cohort differences (where later-born generations are less religious).
Although conversion can be more common in early adulthood, many convert or change religious views also during adulthood or at older ages. The aging process can be conducive to increasing spiritual belief and religious faith, and some may become more religious with age (Coleman, 2013; Moberg, 2012) . Others may turn away from religion as they grow older (Branas-Garza, Garcia-Munoz, & Neuman, 2013; Coleman, Ivani-Chalian, & Robinson, 2004) .
The observed age variation in religion could be an outcome of cohort replacement, where cohorts differ in terms of religious beliefs (Crockett & Voas, 2006; Kaufmann, Goujon, & Skirbekk, 2011) . Successive cohorts of older individuals have a different set of lifetime experiences, opportunities, and health than their predecessors, which may affect their religious beliefs. For instance, later-born cohorts will generally have experienced lower mortality and be better educated than earlier generations, and both longer schooling and higher life expectancy could lead to reduced religiosity (Deaton, 2009; Hungerman, 2011) .
There is substantial variation in fertility levels of different religious groups, with Muslims having the highest fertility level of the groups we consider (Stonawski, Potančoková, Cantele, & Skirbekk, 2016; . Religious belief is frequently passed on from parents to children, and greater fertility thereby contributes to greater population growth of the religious groups with higher fertility, as we have shown in earlier studies (Hackett, Stonawski, Potancǒková, Grim, & Skirbekk, 2015; PEW Research Center, 2015; Skirbekk, Kaufmann, & Goujon, 2010; Stonawski, Skirbekk, Kaufmann, & Goujon, 2015) .
Variation in regional demographic trends can determine the age structures of religious groups. For example, Buddhists and the religiously unaffiliated tend to be located in Asian countries with relatively low fertility and mortality-and therefore rapid population aging-and this contributes to demographic change of these populations. Also, Europe and North America are experiencing relatively rapid demographic change with an aging of both the religiously unaffiliated and the Christian populations UNPD, 2015) .
Data and Methods
We acquired and analyzed religious affiliation information from more than 2,500 data sources, including censuses, demographic surveys, general population surveys, and other studies-the largest project of its kind to date . Our objective at this stage was to estimate religious composition for 5-year age groups separately for men and women for all countries in the world. Censuses were the primary source in 90 nations, which together cover 45% of all people in the world. Large-scale demographic surveys were the primary sources for 43 countries. General population surveys were the primary source of data for an additional 42 countries, representing 37% of the global population. Together, censuses or surveys provided estimates for 175 countries representing 95% of the world's population. In the remaining 57 countries, representing 5% of the world's population, the primary sources for the religious-composition estimates include population registers and institutional membership statistics reported in the World Religion Database and other sources.
We collected data on fertility using censuses and surveys to estimate age and religion-specific fertility rates. Furthermore, we calculated bilateral migration flows by age, sex, and religion for almost 200 countries building on a global flow matrix by sex (Abel, 2013) . We also estimated age trajectories of religious switching using retrospective questions on religion during childhood and current levels from cross-sectional surveys. Details regarding the data sources, the procedures used in gathering the data, carrying out the estimations and harmonizing the data are presented in several technical reports and methodological articles (Hackett et al., 2014; Stonawski, Skirbekk, Hackett, et al., 2015) . We built our model for religious population projections based on the demographic method of multistate population projection models. The method is an extension of cohortcomponent-based population projections. Rather than projecting only age and sex, this method includes one more additional dimensions such as health status, education, political views-or in our case: religion, for example (Rogers, 1995; Stonawski, Skirbekk, Kaufmann, et al., 2015) .
Our main projection scenario that we present in this article assumes that fertility levels of all religious groups slowly converge to an identical levels by 2110 (100 years from the baseline year of our projections). Fertility for the total population of a country follows the UN medium assumptions from the 2010 Revision (UN 2011). At the same time, the relative differences in fertility between religions gradually diminish. This could occur where specific drivers of fertility differentials, such as education levels, are similar across religious groups. We also assume that there are no religion-specific differentials in mortality. In other words, populations of different religious communities have the same life expectancy. However, following the 2010 Revision of UN projection assumptions (UN 2011), we introduce gender-specific differences in mortality based on the UN assumptions of life expectancy by sex. The scenario is based on constant religion-specific outmigration rates by age, sex, and destination matrices by sex and religion calculated for the baseline during the whole period of projection.
Moreover, we also assume that religious switching will continue at rates observed at baseline year.
Using our model, we project changes in religious distributions for 198 countries and territories with at least 100,000 people as of 2010, covering 99.8% of the world's population. We present results for the population aged 60 and older aggregated globally and into six regions: AsiaPacific, Europe, Latin America-Caribbean, Middle EastNorth Africa, North America, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
We account for the effects of international age-specific migration flows in our projections. Global gross migration flows to and from all countries in the world are estimated, and we are therefore able to include the effect of migration on religious age structures across the world . In cases where migration is substantial, the religious affiliation of the migrants can affect the religious affiliation of the region of origin and destination, but only to a modest extent change their age structures (Bernard, Bell, & Charles-Edwards, 2014) . Although migrants tend to be relatively young, the age structures of the sending and destination country tend only to be modestly and temporarily affected by migration flows.
Results
Our 2010 estimates and 2050 projections of age distributions within each religious community are presented in Figures 1 and 2 (ages 0-14, 15-59, 60+) and Figures 3 and 4 (median ages). Estimates of religious proportions of the total 60+ population is given in Table 1 (age groups 60-79 and 80+, years 2010 and 2050, globally and by world region).
Our first finding is that every religious group is experiencing substantive population aging-the global share aged 60 and older increases from 11% to 22% from 2010 to 2050. Demographic changes imply profound aging within every religious group, see Figures 1 and 2. The global population share aged 0-14 is 27% in 2010 but falls to 20% by 2050. In 2010, all eight religions have higher shares aged 0-14 compared with aged 60+ (Figures 1 and  2) , whereas by 2050, six of the eight religions have greater shares aged 60+ than aged 0-14. The proportion among Buddhists below the age of 15 is 20% in 2010 but falls to 14% in 2050, whereas the share aged 60+ grows from 15% to 32%. The proportion among the unaffiliated aged 0-14 falls from 19% to 14%, whereas the proportion aged 60+ grow from 13% to 32% by mid-century.
Median ages of all religions increase, see Figure 3 (median age by religion, globally): The global population of Buddhists, unaffiliated, and Hindus will experience rapid population aging. Both unaffiliated and Buddhists will see median ages rise to over 46 years by 2050, from age 34 years in 2010. The Hindus populations' median age will rise rapidly, from 24 to 37 years in the period 2010-2050, whereas the Christians' median age rises only slowly, from 29 to 35 years. The Muslims' median age increases from 23 to 33 years. Jews will only experience modest aging, with median ages rising from 37 to 40 years, making the rankorder position of this religion in terms of median age fall from the first to the third position, behind the Buddhists and the unaffiliated. Figure 4 shows median ages for unaffiliated, Muslims, and Christians for the continents where they are most populous. In Sub-Sahara Africa, Christians and Muslims see median ages rise from the late teens to the mid-20s. In rapidly aging Latin America, median ages of the Christians and the unaffiliated rise from the mid-20s to above 40 years. In Europe, median ages for the Muslims rise by only 8 years (from the early 30s), the rise is similar for the unaffiliated (whose median age in 2010 was in the late 30s), and about 5 years for Christians who were in their early 40s in 2010. In the Asia-Pacific, all religious groups are experiencing swift changes in age distributions; the unaffiliated will see their median age increase from 35 to 48 years, whereas among Muslims, it will increase from 24 to 37 years. Table 1 shows the proportions in each religious group of the total 60+ population. Our worldwide projections suggest that the share of Muslims will grow from 14% to 24% among those aged 60-79 in the period 2010-2050, whereas the proportion of Muslims will rise from 10% to 15% among those aged 80 and older.
Although we project a decline in the global share of the religiously unaffiliated from 16% of the total population in 2010 to 13% in 2050 Stonawski, Skirbekk, Hackett, et al., 2015) , there is likely to be an increase in the proportion who are religiously unaffiliated among the oldest age groups. For those aged 80+, the unaffiliated proportion will rise from 17% to 23%. The rise in the share at the oldest age category (in spite of a general decline) is because (a) the largest unaffiliated cohorts are likely to reach older age groups during the projection period (cohort replacement)-ongoing secularization is not projected to be sufficient to increase the unaffiliated share of younger cohorts at the global level (though younger cohorts are expected to be more unaffiliated in some countries and regions, such as North America and Europe) and (b) unaffiliated people tend to live in countries in advanced stages of the demographic transition, with relatively low fertility and high life expectancy. Jews will see their proportions among older age groups in the world decrease, with the share among the 60-to 79-year-olds in the Middle East and North Africa decreasing from 4% to 2% and among the 80+ falling from 9% to 4% from 2010 to 2050. The decline follows the higher relative growth of other religions. In North America, their shares will decline only marginally, with percentages falling less than 2% for both the 60-to 79-year-olds and the 80+.
Buddhists will see declining shares among older age groups throughout the world in the 2010-2050 period. Most Buddhists are living in the Asia-Pacific region, where their shares fall from 17% to 12% among the 60-to 79-year-olds and from 23% to 16% among the 80+. The decline in the Buddhist population follows a history of relatively low birth rates and low population growth .
Hindus will experience growth toward 2050, rising from 20% to 24% among the 60-to 79-year-olds in the Asia-Pacific, and rising from 15% to 17% for those aged 80+. The growth in the Hindu older population results primarily from an increase in the life expectancy of India (the majority of Hindus are Indian) and the growth in the relative population size of this country (UNPD, 2015).
Discussion and Limitations
Our study has shown that religious groups differ in terms of their age distributions and the pace of aging. Globally, in 2010, Muslims were least likely to be aged 60 and older (7% of all Muslims), and Jews were most likely to be among this age group (20%). By 2050, Buddhists and the religiously unaffiliated are likely to have the oldest populations (32% above the age of 60 in each group), whereas Muslims will remain the youngest religious group (with only 16% above the age of 60). Christians will age relatively slow, from 14% to 21% above the age of 60 from 2010 to 2050.
The age distribution of religious and nonreligious groups influences how religious affiliation affects a society. For instance, the rapid aging of the unaffiliated and Buddhists and the relatively young age structure of Muslims and Christians can affect how religion is expressed. Older age groups tend to emphasize religion in terms of its relevance for intergenerational relationships and support, traditions and norms, as meaning, relief and solace in the face of life challenges and disease, coping strategies in the event of health challenges, as well as rituals relating to end-of-life practices (McGrath, 2003) . Younger individuals may seek religion to a greater extent as a guidance for behavior, for choice of lifestyles, education, family formation, and work (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 2014) . The shifting age composition of religious affiliation may affect how people view different religious groups, as people's evaluation of specific religions may be affected by the religion's age composition. A large-scale U.S. survey revealed negative attitudes toward both specific religions and age groups. The study showed that participants of all religions implicitly evaluated their own religion most positively and the remaining religions in accordance with the following hierarchy: Christianity > Judaism > Hinduism or Buddhism > Islam; however, they also revealed less positive views of individuals of older ages, where most positive evaluations were of children > young adults > middle-age adults > older adults (Axt, Ebersole, & Nosek, 2014) . In effect, changes in the age distribution of religious affiliation could influence how a religion is perceived, and an older age structure could possibly imply more negative views toward specific religions.
The fact that those who are religiously unaffiliated will become older relative to most religious groups is striking. The religiously unaffiliated will age rapidly, which could affect the "image" this group represents (Kornadt & Rothermund, 2011) . The religiously unaffiliated may at a global level shift from a group representing the future to one increasingly representing the past following overall expected decline and aging . The movement away from religion has been more common in regions of the world that were early in experiencing population aging, such as parts of East Asia and Western countries. Globally, the share of religiously unaffiliated in the 15-29 age group is projected to fall from 16% to 11%, whereas the share among the 75-to 89-year-olds is likely to grow from 18% to 22% from 2010 to 2050.
The aging of the unaffiliated could also have other important implications. For instance, changes in the religious orientation of the frail and care dependent could change the extent of spiritual support that health care personnel should offer (Heo & Koeske, 2013) . A growing share of the older population that does not follow a religious faith may for instance affect preferences toward types of palliative care (Smith-Stoner, 2007) .
This study gives the first estimates of religious affiliation by age globally, based on more than 2000 samples of representative data covering 99.8% of the world's population. We also give projections on changes until 2050. Our focus is on individuals aged 60 and older. Our finding that adherents from all religions are aging (although at very different paces), and that the religious composition of older populations is changing rapidly, can have important social implications, some of which have been discussed in this study. Future work could include a focus on changing belief patterns among religious subgroups.
